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 The EU and its Neighbours 
 Central Issues 
•  This chapter examines the wide range of policies and means through which the EU 
engages with the countries in its neighbourhood. First, the EU ’ s relations with the 
Western Balkan countries and Turkey, both formally involved in the EU ’ s enlarge-
ment policy, will be addressed. Second, specifi c attention will be devoted to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004 for those countries who 
are not eligible for membership either permanently or in the short to medium term. 
Third and fi nally, EU relations with neighbouring countries not taking part in the 
ENP or the enlargement process will be discussed. 
•  The  ENP was formally launched in 2004, against the background of the fi fth 
enlargement, and aims to create a special relationship with those neighbouring 
countries to the South and East that are not included in the enlargement process. 
From an instrumental perspective, this policy provides an excellent case study on 
the use of soft law in EU external relations law. From a methodological perspective, 
it illustrates how the EU has drawn on objectives and processes from EU enlarge-
ment policy and applied them in a non-accession context, with commensurate 
diffi  culties. As regards instruments it builds on binding bilateral frameworks and 
then utilises a plethora of soft legal documents to re-orientate them towards new 
neighbourhood objectives. 
•  The  Russian Federation preferred not to take part in the ENP. Attempts to develop 
a  ‘ Strategic Partnership ’ , including an upgrade of the bilateral legal framework, 
faced signifi cant legal and political hurdles. In particular, Russia ’ s annexation of 
Crimea and the confl ict in Eastern Ukraine seriously aff ected bilateral relations 
and resulted in the adoption of sanctions and the freezing of some policy dialogues 
and cooperation mechanisms. 
438 THE EU AND ITS NEIGHBOURS
  1  Common Position 1999/345/CFSP concerning a Stability Pact for South- Eastern Europe [1999] 
OJ L133/1;  S  Blockmans ,  Tough Love:  The European Union ’ s Relations with the Western Balkans 
( The Hague ,  TMC Asser Press ,  2007 )  248 . 
  2  D  Phinnemore ,  ‘ Stabilisation and Association Agreements :  Europe Agreements for the Western 
Balkans ? ’ ( 2003 )  8  European Foreign Aff airs Review  77, 81 . 
•  With the  countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) , the EU has 
attained a depth of integration that is so extensive that, should these countries 
wish, they could accede to the EU rather rapidly. However, for most of these 
countries there is no such desire and alternative legal structures are presently in 
place: the so-called  ‘ bilaterals ’ with Switzerland, and the European Economic Area 
(EEA) with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. These legal relationships present 
the Union with a specifi c challenge of  ‘ legal homogeneity ’ in the application of the 
EU  acquis beyond the EU legal space. 
 I. Neighbours with an Accession Perspective: 
Western Balkans and Turkey 
 Without analysing the procedural aspects of the EU ’ s enlargement policy, which is 
discussed in  Chapter 14 , it is clear that the perspective of membership is a signifi cant 
tool in designing the EU ’ s relations with its (European) neighbours. Such a  perspective 
is formally granted to the countries of the Western Balkans in the framework of 
the so-called Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and to Turkey, which is a 
long-standing associated country of the EU. 
 A. The Stabilisation and Association Process in the Western Balkans 
 The EU ’ s policy towards the Western Balkans started in 1999 with the Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe, launched in Cologne on 10 June 1999. Initiated in the context 
of the EU ’ s CFSP, 1 it was not an EU foreign policy instrument but rather a  multilateral 
political declaration and framework agreement including alongside the EU and its 
Member States. The G-8 countries and a wide range of international organisations 
including the international fi nancial institutions, as well as the UN, OSCE, OECD, 
NATO and others were involved. A crucial aspect of that initiative was that the Union 
provided an express accession perspective to the Western Balkan countries,  applying 
the methodology which had been developed earlier in relation to the CEECs: the 
conclusion of bilateral Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with a strong 
element of conditionality and exporting of the EU  acquis as a means of preparing the 
associated countries for EU accession. Despite the considerable similarities with the old 
Europe Agreements, a distinct type of association was  nevertheless deemed necessary 
to tackle the particular challenges regarding the Western Balkans. 2 The most signifi cant 
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diff erence was the focus on stabilisation on the basis of regional  cooperation and good 
neighbourliness within the framework of the so-called Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP) covering Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which later became 
Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo according to resolution 1244 of the United Nations 
Security Council). 3 
 The central objective of the SAP is to foster a process of regional reconciliation and 
cooperation based on common political and economic goals. Of particular signifi cance 
is the off er of a so-called  ‘ European perspective ’ , implying that the participating coun-
tries are recognised as potential candidates for EU membership. This is confi rmed in 
so many words in the preamble of the bilateral SAAs, creating an explicit link between 
the successful implementation of the agreement and progress towards the objective of 
membership. 
 The latest SAA with Kosovo is a special case in the sense that it is concluded as an 
EU-only agreement and with the explicit proviso that this does not constitute recogni-
tion of Kosovo as an independent state. 4 This reality has some implications regarding 
the formulation of certain provisions and the scope of the agreement. For instance, 
the preamble to the SAA with Kosovo carefully avoids the words  ‘ potential candi-
date Member State ’ , which can be found in all other SAAs. Alternatively, it uses the 
more diplomatic formula that implementation of the SAA  ‘ will lead to progress in 
Kosovo ’ s European perspective and rapprochement with the EU, should objective 
 circumstances so permit and Kosovo fulfi l the criteria defi ned by the European Council 
in Copenhagen on 21 – 22 June 1993 and the aforementioned conditionalities ’ . 5 The 
abundant use of the caveat  ‘ should objective circumstances so permit ’ in the  preamble, 
but also in several provisions of the SAA, reveals the uncertainties regarding the 
development of EU-Kosovo relations and thus prompted some legal creativity. 
 P Van Elsuwege,  ‘ Legal Creativity in EU External Relations: The Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo ’ (2017) 22  European 
Foreign Aff airs Review 393, 408 
 The EU – Kosovo SAA cannot be disconnected from the broader  political 
context, in particular the SAP for the Western Balkans and the process of 
reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo. So far, the EU has been quite 
successful in brokering bilateral deals between Kosovo and Serbia. In return, 
both Kosovo and Serbia could make signifi cant steps forward in their process 
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of rapprochement with the EU. The opening of accession negotiations with 
Serbia and the conclusion of the SAA with Kosovo are signifi cant landmarks 
on the long and diffi  cult journey towards stabilisation of the Western Balkans 
region. The EU used this opportunity to codify its leadership role in this process 
and to  operationalise the principle of good neighbourliness as a key condi-
tion for further progress  … Be that as it may, the unresolved issue of Kosovo ’ s 
 international legal status implies that the EU-Kosovo SAA is an example of 
legal creativity. The EU stretched the limits of its competence to conclude an 
agreement that, to the extent possible, refl ects the SAAs concluded with the 
other Western Balkan countries without recognising Kosovo as a sovereign 
state. Accordingly, the EU – Kosovo SAA is fully in line with the offi  cial policy of 
 ‘ diversity on recognition but unity in engagement ’ . Nevertheless, this approach 
is not without consequences  … Despite the incorporation of Kosovo in the SAP 
and numerous declarations about its  ‘ European vocation ’ , it is no coincidence 
that the SAA carefully avoids the explicit qualifi cation of Kosovo as a  ‘ potential 
candidate for EU membership ’ . Concluding a bilateral agreement with a country 
with an asterisk is one thing but accepting a potential Member State with an 
asterisk is something completely diff erent. In other words, the asterisk solution 
is an interesting tool to proceed with the development of EU-Kosovo relations 
in the short term, but it is not tenable in the middle to long term, at least as far 
as the granting of EU membership perspectives is concerned. 
 In February 2018, the Commission confi rmed the accession perspective of the Western 
Balkan countries. Moreover, it linked the future of the EU ’ s enlargement strategy to 
the general reform of the EU by 2025 and envisaged the possible membership for 
Serbia and Montenegro by this date. 
 European Commission, A Credible Enlargement Perspective for an Enhanced 
EU Engagement with the Western Balkans, COM (2018) 65 fi nal, 17 
 The EU has long supported the European perspective of the Western Balkans. 
The future of the region as an integral part of the EU is in the  Union ’ s very own 
political, security and economic interest. The EU ’ s enlargement policy is part 
and parcel of the larger strategy to strengthen the Union by 2025. With strong 
political will, delivery of real and sustained reforms, and defi nitive solutions 
to disputes with neighbours, Serbia and Montenegro  could potentially be ready 
for membership by this date . Accession is and will  remain a merit-based process 
fully dependent on the objective progress achieved by each country. 
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 B. Turkey: A Long-standing Associated Country 
 The EEC and Turkey signed an association agreement in 1963. 6 An additional  protocol, 
signed in 1970 and which entered into force in 1973, introduced more specifi c commit-
ments regarding the gradual establishment of a customs union and the envisaged 
introduction of free movement of persons and services. For this purpose, the asso-
ciation council had to adopt the necessary implementing decisions. Even though the 
latter failed to take the measures required for the introduction of a free movement 
regime in the relations between the EU and Turkey, this institutional body played a 
crucial role in the deepening of the bilateral relations. It signifi cantly strengthened 
the legal  position of Turkish workers inside the Union 7 and provided for the estab-
lishment of the customs union with the adoption of Association Decision No 1/95 
in December 1995. 8 The EU – Turkey association  acquis , including the association 
agreement, the additional protocol and the association council decisions, has been the 
subject of multiple proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). 9 Despite this close relationship, Turkey ’ s bid for accession has thus far been 
 unsuccessful (see Chapter 14). 
 II. The European Neighbourhood Policy 
 A. Article 8 TEU: Competence or Objective ? 
 The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new legal basis for developing the EU ’ s relations with 
its neighbouring countries in Article 8 TEU. The fi rst proposals for such a specifi c 
 ‘ neighbourhood clause ’ were launched within the European Convention during the 
preparation of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2002/03 and 
coincided with the emerging European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 10 In this way, 
the Treaty constitutionalises the special relationship with the neighbourhood that was 
considered politically expedient to avoid new dividing lines between those nations that 
were part of the fi fth enlargement in 2004, and those that were not. 
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 Article 8 TEU 
 1.  The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, 
founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful 
relations based on cooperation. 
 2.  For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specifi c agree-
ments with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain 
reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking 
activities jointly. Their implementation shall be the subject of periodic 
consultation. 
 The fi rst paragraph of Article 8 corresponds with Article 21 TEU in that it sets out 
an objective for the Union, specifi c to its neighbourhood. Importantly, however, the 
provision is strongly worded. First of all, the Union  ‘ shall ’ develop special relations 
with the neighbours, meaning that the EU can therefore not choose not to have a 
neighbourhood policy. 11 Secondly, the policy aims at creating an  ‘ area of prosperity 
and good neighbourliness ’ implying a multilateral dimension of the neighbourhood 
policy. Thirdly, the relationship must be based on the values of the Union, thereby 
referring back to Article 3(5) TEU and injecting the latter provision into the relation-
ship with the neighbours. 
 The second paragraph of this provision pertains to the instrument through which 
to attain the objective set out in relation to the neighbourhood:  ‘ specifi c ’ agreements 
with the neighbours. The striking similarity with the wording of Article 217 TFEU on 
association raises questions about the relationship between both provisions. Given the 
absence of specifi c procedural guidelines under Article 218 TFEU, Article 8(2) TEU 
may be viewed in a similar vein to Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU: stating an objective, but 
not providing a substantive legal basis. Article 8 TEU indicates the key features and 
objectives of EU engagement with its neighbours but does not confer new or distinct 
powers upon the Union. This is supported by the fact that the Commission proposal 
for the ENP funding Regulation from 2014 onwards views Article 8 TEU as  ‘ providing 
the general thrust and basis for the ENP ’ , but that the actual legal basis for the fi nanc-
ing instrument would be Articles 209(1) and 212(2) TFEU. 12 Similarly, the association 
agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia do not include a single reference to 
Article 8 TEU and have been concluded on the substantive legal basis of Articles 37 
TEU (CFSP) and 217 TFEU (association). 13 
THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY 443
  14  See  E  Philippart and  G  Edwards ,  ‘ The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership :  Fragmentation and 
Reconstruction ’ ( 1997 )  4  European Foreign Aff airs Review  465, 465 – 89 . 
  15  A Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Syria was initialled in 2004 and, after a revision, 
in 2008 but it was never signed. Libya is the other country from the Southern Mediterranean which has no 
association agreement with the EU. 
  16  See, on this particular agreement, E Lannon,  ‘ L ’ accord d ’ association int é rimaire: Communaut é 
europ é enne-OLP: l ’ institutionnalisation progressive des relations euro-palestiniennes ’ (1997) 1  Revue des 
aff aires europ é ennes 169. 
 P Van Elsuwege and R Petrov,  ‘ Legal Perspectives on the Study of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy ’ in T Schumacher, A Marchetti and T Demmelhuber (eds) 
 The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy (Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2018) 108 
 Rather than providing a new type of integration arrangement, which stops 
short of accession but goes beyond existing forms of partnership and associa-
tion, Article 8 TEU only institutionalises the ambiguity that also characterises 
the ENP. Apart from the uncertain procedural requirements for the applica-
tion of this provision, it appears that most of the neighbouring countries are 
not interested in such a formula  … Moreover, the special relationship envis-
aged under Article 8 TEU lacks exclusivity. It is not at all clear what kind of 
specifi c benefi ts it off ers to neighbouring countries in comparison to traditional 
association or even partnership agreements  … Finally, it remains to be seen to 
what extent the objective of creating  ‘ reciprocal rights ’ would allow the neigh-
bouring countries to contribute eff ectively to the development of the bilateral 
relationship. As a result, the neighbourhood clause may be regarded as a largely 
symbolic or  ‘ utopian ’ provision which does not solve the complexities relating 
to the search of an appropriate legal basis for the conclusion of international 
agreements with neighbouring countries  … 
 B. Key Features of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
 Before the formal launch of the ENP, the EU had already developed a frame-
work for cooperation with its Southern Mediterranean neighbours through the 
 ‘ Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ’ (EMP or Euromed). The latter, also known as 
the Barcelona process, started in 1995 and aimed to establish a regular dialogue on 
political and security matters; economic, trade and fi nancial cooperation includ-
ing the creation of a free trade area as well as cooperation on social, cultural and 
human aff airs. 14 Within this context, the EU concluded bilateral Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements (EMAAs) with seven countries of the Southern Mediterranean 
(Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and Lebanon) 15 and a special 
 ‘ Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and co-operation ’ with 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). 16 With countries of the former Soviet 
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Union, a network of bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) was 
concluded in the second half  of the 1990s. In its famous Agenda 2000 Communication 
published in 1997, the European Commission already briefl y refl ected about the conse-
quences of the EU ’ s eastward enlargement for relations with countries such as Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. 17 However, it was only with the 2002 refl ection paper 
written by the, at that time, High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana and 
Commissioner for external relations, Chris Patten, that the debate about a new neigh-
bourhood policy really kicked off . 18 The Solana-Patten Joint Letter sketched four key 
issues the Union would have to consider in designing the European neighbourhood 
policy and outlined some tentative answers: 
•  The geographic scope of policy: which neighbours to include and not to include ? 
•  What would the EU hope to achieve with the new initiative: its interests, values and 
objectives ? 
•  How to ensure there is no ambiguity on the (absence of) link with further 
enlargement ? 
•  What method and instruments would be used to carry out the policy: full  application 
of conditionality ? 
 Javier Solana and Chris Patten,  Joint Letter, Wider Europe , 7 August 2002 
(extracts  – emphasis in original) 
 1.  What should be  the geographical coverage of  this exercise ? The enlarged 
Union ’ s neighbours fall into three main regional groupings: the Mediterranean 
(Barcelona Process); the Western Balkans (Stabilisation and Association 
Process); and Russia and the other eastern neighbours (Partnership and 
Co-operation Agreements)  … The imminent enlargement presents an 
opportunity to develop a more coherent and durable basis for  relations 
with our immediate neighbours. The pace and scope of this process will 
have to be fl exible  – there can be no one-size-fi ts-all approach  … Looking to 
the medium and longer term, we could foresee a gradually evolving frame-
work surrounding the Union, which would nevertheless stop short of full 
membership or creating shared institutions. 
 2.  How do we want to  develop our relations with present and future 
 neighbours ? The three main geographical groupings above can be distin-
guished by what we say about their prospect of accession to the EU. 
For the Balkans it is an explicit goal  … in the Mediterranean (apart 
from current  candidates) membership is explicitly excluded  … our future 
eastern  neighbours fall somewhat uncomfortably in between. Making their 
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situation less ambivalent  … particularly for Ukraine which is most actively 
seeking more concrete recognition of her European aspirations is probably 
the most immediate challenge for our neighbourhood policy. This requires 
the delineation of an ambitious but workable policy framework for the next 
ten years or so, without closing any options for the more distant future. 
 3.  What are our interests and what do we want to achieve ? There are a number 
of overriding objectives for our neighbourhood policy ? Stability, prosper-
ity, shared values and rule of law  … failure in any of these will lead to 
increased risks of negative spill-over on the Union.  … 
 5.  Do we need to create  new contractual arrangements such as  Neighbourhood 
or Proximity Agreements ? There is already scope to upgrade relations 
within the existing agreements with the countries concerned and we must 
guard against cosmetic changes  … becoming a substitute for substantive 
measures. The debate needs careful handling to avoid unrealistic expec-
tations over the prospects of future enlargement. On the other hand, if  
we decide to set out specifi c and qualitatively enhanced objectives for our 
policy, this could justify a relabeling of our relations. Moreover, the strong 
symbolism of a new label that marks a strengthened commitment of the 
Union could help to raise the profi le of relations with the EU and thus 
unlock additional political will and administrative capacity. 
 On the basis of this joint letter, we can examine the key choices which were subse-
quently made in in designing the ENP, in particular as far as the geographical scope, 
objectives and methodology are concerned. It is noteworthy that individual Member 
State foreign policy priorities, as well as third-country demands and external geopoliti-
cal events have progressively shaped the outlook of the ENP. Of particular relevance 
are two major revisions which took place against the background of signifi cant 
geo political evolutions in the EU ’ s neighbourhood: the Arab Spring (2011) and the 
confl ict in Ukraine (2015). 
 C. Geographic Scope: Confl uence of Geopolitics and Member State Interests 
 In line with Agenda 2000 and the later Solana-Patten Joint Letter, the  ‘ New Neighbours 
Initiative ’ discussed in the Council in October 2002 focused only on the Eastern 
Neighbours and was bilateral in nature: an upgrade in relations with Ukraine, Moldova 
and Belarus, as well as Russia. 19 However, in 2003, the Russian Federation refused 
to be treated on an equal basis with the other three countries, so the Union instead 
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decided to create a bilateral  ‘ strategic partnership ’ with that country. Subsequently, 
under pressure from Member States such as Italy, France and Spain who did not 
want to see the Southern nations receive less attention in EU external policy, the 
Mediterranean rim was also included in the ENP. 20 As the  ‘ Rose Revolution ’ unfolded 
in Georgia in 2003, by 2005 the ENP also came to encompass the Southern Caucasus: 
the EU wished to reward that country for its return to democracy and also included 
Georgia ’ s neighbours Azerbaijan and Armenia. As a result, the ENP covered relations 
with Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Libya, 
Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine Authority, Tunisia, Syria and Ukraine. Four 
countries (Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria) were not actively involved because legal 
and political reasons stood in the way of developing  ‘ standard ’ ENP relations: the EU 
did not have an Association Agreement or, in the case of Belarus, a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement due to the absence of compliance with EU values on rule of 
law and democracy. 
 The single geographic scope was rather artifi cial, which was all the clearer when 
the French EU Presidency in 2008 strongly pushed for the launch of a  ‘ Union for 
the Mediterranean ’ (UMed). Former President Sarkozy saw it as a distinct regional 
component separate from the ENP, but other Member States and the Commission 
strongly objected to France moving ahead with this proposal. 21 Thus, as a compro-
mise this Southern dimension was  ‘ latched on ’ to the ENP as a regional dimension 
to the ENP, named  ‘ Barcelona Process  – Union for the Mediterranean ’ . However, a 
lack of enthusiasm from the EU institutions and Member States, and because of events 
in the Middle East in early 2009, the UMed broadly failed to deliver. Subsequently, 
the idea of carving out a clearer Eastern dimension to the ENP was fl oated in a 
Polish-Swedish non-paper of May 2008, partially in response to the French MedU 
proposal. On the basis of this initiative, the European Council of 19 – 20 June 2008 
invited the Commission to prepare a proposal on the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and 
the Extraordinary European Council of 1 September 2008 asked this work to be accel-
erated in the wake of the Russian-Georgian war of August 2018. 22 The EaP, formally 
launched with the adoption of a Joint Declaration on the occasion of a special  ‘ Eastern 
Partnership Summit ’ in Prague on 7 May 2009, combines the ambition of deeper bilat-
eral engagement, including the prospect of association and visa liberalisation, with 
a regional framework for cooperation with the Eastern ENP countries. Hence, an 
increasing diff erentiation between the Eastern and Southern dimension of the ENP 
can be observed. Moreover, an increased diff erentiation within each geographical 
sub-group can be observed as a result of diverging ambitions among the partners 
countries. However, the term ENP remains in existence as a political umbrella: it 
encompasses all initiatives which share the neighbourhood as their geographic focus, 
and which have certain methodological and fi nancial approaches in common. 
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 State of play ENP  South  East 
 Regional/Multilateral 
dimension 
 Union for the Mediterranean  Eastern Partnership 
 Bilateral dimension  Maghreb and Mashreq 
countries 
 Ukraine Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus 
 D. Objectives: A Stable and Prosperous Neighbourhood for a Secure Union 
 The Council has described the objectives of the ENP as sharing  ‘ the benefi ts of an 
enlarged EU with neighbouring countries in order to contribute to increased stability, 
security and prosperity of the European Union and its neighbours ’ . 23 This mirrored the 
Commission ’ s formulation which was  ‘ to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe 
and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the 
Union ’ . 24 These formulations indicated the logic on which the ENP was constructed. 
In essence, the ENP was to be considered a security policy because, following the 2004 
enlargement, the EU would have very diff erent countries and challenges right outside 
its borders. Thus, with this policy, the EU wished to create stable and prosperous 
neighbours to ensure its own security. This approach is still valid, as can be derived 
from the 2016 Global Strategy. 25 
 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, June 2016, 14 and 25 
 Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home 
entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions. 
It implies a broader interest in preventing confl ict, promoting human security, 
addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world  … 
 State and societal resilience is our strategic priority in the neighbourhood. 
Many people within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
both to the east and to the south wish to build closer relations with the Union. 
Our enduring power of attraction can spur transformation and is not aimed 
against any country. 
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 The fact that the ENP is a security policy should not be understood as meaning that 
this policy falls squarely within the remit of the Union ’ s CFSP competence. Rather, the 
ENP and the Global Strategy refl ect a broad consensus that security in the twenty-fi rst 
century is  ‘ comprehensive ’ and must bring together all the instruments, capabilities 
and policies of the EU and its Member States. This means that the ENP is very much 
an  ‘ umbrella policy ’ which aims to coalesce all aspects of EU external relations in 
a coherent whole: CFSP, but also trade, migration, environment, energy and so on; 
encompassing both EU and Member State external policies. 
 Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy, Review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Joint (2015) 50 fi nal, 3–4 
 The ENP is a long-term engagement with the EU ’ s neighbours, but it also 
needs to take account of the most pressing needs. In the next three to fi ve 
years, the most urgent challenge in many parts of the neighbourhood is stabi-
lisation. The causes of instability often lie outside the security domain alone. 
The EU ’ s approach will seek to comprehensively address sources of instability 
across sectors. Poverty, inequality, a perceived sense of injustice, corruption, 
weak economic and social development and lack of opportunity,  particularly 
for young people, can be roots of instability, increasing vulnerability to 
 radicalisation. The new ENP will make a determined eff ort to support econo-
mies and improve prospects for the local population. The policy should help 
make partner countries places where people want to build their future, and 
help tackle uncontrolled movement of people. 
 E. Methodology: Inspiration from Enlargement 
 The objectives of stability and prosperity are clearly inspired by the EU’s pre-accession 
policy, but the parallels between the ENP and enlargement do not stop there. Both 
policies are horizontal in nature in the sense that they do not belong to any of the EU ’ s 
specifi c competences. This explains why the soft law instruments developed within the 
enlargement context proved very useful tools that could be easily adopted and adapted 
without falling into the pitfalls of competence-related struggles. From a legal perspec-
tive, it therefore made sense to transplant the instruments and methodologies of what 
was perceived to be a very successful enlargement policy to the ENP. 
 B Van Vooren,  EU External Relations Law and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy: A Paradigm for Coherence (Abingdon, Routledge, 2012) 178 
 The ENP was constructed in a focused eff ort to provide synergies between 
diff erent policies towards the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood and sought 
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to upgrade Union action across the board in light of the security, stability and 
prosperity objectives. In constructing the ENP towards these ends, we can 
observe a skeleton of hard legal instruments co-existing with a plethora of 
soft (legal) instruments which are not specifi cally connected to competences 
or policy areas.  … the true innovation of the ENP ’ s policy framework [is] its 
legal and political construction in comparison to other policies such as trade or 
development [ie] its use of  ‘ soft law ’ to attain a coherent external policy for the 
European Union as a whole. 
 Mirroring the accession partnerships developed within the framework of the EU ’ s 
enhanced pre-accession strategy, ENP Action Plans defi ning short and medium-term 
objectives for political, economic and legal reform constituted the key instrument of 
the ENP. Based upon Commission monitoring reports analysing the progress in meet-
ing the defi ned priorities, the Council would then defi ne the scope for new contractual 
arrangements with each ENP partner country. 
 The two revisions of the ENP gradually developed the ENP instruments and meth-
odology. The fi rst revision of 2011 introduced the  ‘ more for more ’ principle, implying 
that additional reform eff orts by partner countries were to be rewarded with additional 
fi nancial and other support. 
 European Commission, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Aff airs and 
Security Policy, A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, COM (2011) 
303 fi nal, 28 
 Increased EU support will depend on progress in building and consolidat-
ing democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and the faster a 
country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive 
from the EU. This enhanced support will come in various forms, including 
increased funding for social and economic development, larger programmes 
for institution-building (CIB), greater market access, increased EIB fi nancing 
in support of investments; and greater facilitation of mobility. These prefer-
ential commitments will be tailored to the needs of each country and to the 
regional context. They will recognise that meaningful reform comes with signifi -
cant upfront costs. For countries where reform has not taken place, the EU will 
reconsider or even reduce funding. 
 The second revision of 2015 introduced additional changes, which refl ect the grow-
ing fl exibility and diff erentiation of the ENP with an increased focus on tailor-made 
approaches for each neighbour without however abandoning the overarching policy 
framework. 
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 373 fi nal , 12 May 2004. 
 Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy, Review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Joint (2015) 50 fi nal, 5 
 There will no longer be a single set of progress reports on all countries simulta-
neously. Instead the EU will seek to develop a new style of assessment, focusing 
specifi cally on meeting the goals agreed with partners. These reports will be 
timed to provide the basis for a political exchange of views in the relevant 
high-level meetings with partner countries, such as Association/Cooperation 
Councils. For those partners who prefer to focus on a more limited number of 
strategic priorities, the reporting framework will be adjusted to refl ect the new 
focus. In addition to the country-specifi c reporting, regular reports will track 
developments in the neighbourhood. These reports will contain the elements 
required under the Regulation on the European Neighbourhood Instrument, 
including information on fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, gender equal-
ity and human rights issues. 
 The new ENP should be the focus for a more coherent eff ort by the EU and the 
Member States. The EU is more infl uential when united in a common approach 
and communicating a single message. It off ers partners more when using its 
resources in a strategic and well-coordinated way. Therefore, alongside discus-
sions with partners, there will be a greater role for the Council and Member 
States in identifying priorities and in supporting their implementation. This will 
include joint programming. Member States will be invited to play the role of 
lead partner for certain initiatives or to accompany certain reform eff orts. 
 In the absence of an accession perspective, the upgrading of the bilateral legal relations 
was devised a major carrot for the ENP countries. The initial Commission documents 
referred to the prospect of new  ‘ European Neighbourhood Agreements ’ , 26 but it soon 
became clear that not all ENP partner countries were interested in the negotiation 
of such a new type of agreement. Ukraine, for instance, strongly opposed the use of 
the  ‘ neighbourhood ’ label and insisted on a classical association agreement instead. 
The off er of association was explicitly included in the design of the EaP whereas, 
for the Southern neighbours, a modernisation of their existing EMAAs was put on 
the agenda. 
 The Association Agreements concluded with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova 
within the framework of the EaP replace the old PCAs and provide for a signifi cant 
upgrade of the bilateral relations with the countries concerned. They establish an 
enhanced institutional framework and include innovative provisions on regulatory 
and legislative approximation. Of particular signifi cance is the ambition to establish 
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Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), leading to the associated 
countries ’ gradual (but partial) integration into the EU internal market. This implies a 
 far-reaching liberalisation of trade in goods and services and the abolition of non-tariff  
barriers through regulatory convergence with regard to issues such as the protection 
of intellectual property rights, competition law, rules of origin, labour standards and 
environmental protection. 
 G Van der Loo, P Van Elsuwege and R Petrov,  ‘ The EU – Ukraine Association 
Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument ’ , EUI Working Paper 
Law 2014/09, 2 – 3 
 [T]he EU – Ukraine AA is unique in many respects and, therefore, provides a 
new type of integration without membership. The agreement can be character-
ised by three specifi c features:  comprehensiveness ,  complexity and  conditionality . 
 First, the AA is a  comprehensive framework agreement covering the entire spec-
trum of EU-Ukraine relations. Hence, it includes provisions dealing with the 
whole array of EU activities, including cooperation and convergence in the 
fi eld of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as well as cooperation in 
the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). Moreover, due to the inclu-
sion of provisions on nuclear energy and areas falling within Member State 
competences, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and all EU 
Member States are also contracting parties to the agreement  … 
 Second, the  complexity of  the AA is not only related to its comprehensive scope 
but also to its level of ambition, in particular the aim to achieve Ukraine ’ s 
economic integration in the EU internal market through the establishment of 
a DCFTA. The objective of  ‘ deep ’ integration requires extensive legislative and 
regulatory approximation including sophisticated mechanisms to secure the 
uniform interpretation and eff ective implementation of relevant EU legislation. 
 Last but not least, the EU-Ukraine AA is based on a strict  conditionality 
approach. The preamble to the agreement explicitly states that  ‘ political asso-
ciation and economic integration of Ukraine within the European Union will 
depend on progress in the implementation of the current agreement as well as 
 Ukraine ’ s track record in ensuring respect for common values, and progress in 
achieving convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas . ’ This 
link between the third country ’ s performance and the deepening of the EU ’ s 
engagement is a key characteristic of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Whereas this principle has so-far 
been applied on the basis of soft-law instruments such as Action Plans and 
the Association Agenda, it is now encapsulated in a legally binding bilateral 
agreement. 
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EAEU forms a customs union, the elaboration of bilateral DCFTAs with the EU is excluded. This is one of 
the reasons why Armenia decided to terminate the preparations for the conclusion of an AA with the EU in 
the summer of 2013. 
  28  Council Decision (EU) 2018/104 on the signing, on behalf  of the Union, and provisional application of 
the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European 
Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the 
other part [2018] OJ L 23/1. 
  29  G  Van der Loo ,  ‘ Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs with Tunisia and Morocco ’ 
( 2016 )  28  EuroMesco Paper . Available at:  www.ceps.eu/publications/mapping-out-scope-and-contents-dcftas-
tunisia-and-morocco . 
  30  In a series of judgments, the CJEU concluded that the EU-Morocco Association Agreement nor 
the EU ’ s fi sheries agreement with Morocco apply to the territory of the Western Sahara, which is a non-
self-governing territory in accordance with Art 73 of the UN Charter. See  Case C-104/16  Council v Front 
Polisarsio ,  ECLI:EU: C:2016:973 and  Case C-266/16  Western Sahara Campaign UK ,  ECLI:EU: C:2018:118. 
For comments see, eg,  P  Van Elsuwege ,  ‘ The Principle of Self-determination between the EU and its 
Neighbours: between  Realpolitik and Respect for International Law ’ ( 2018 )  1  Zeitschrift f ü r  ö ff entliches 
Recht ,  747, 747 – 65 . 
 It is noteworthy that Armenia decided not to conclude an association agreement with 
the EU in 2013 in light of the country ’ s later accession to the Eurasian Economic 
Union. 27 Alternatively, a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA) was signed in November 2017. 28 The latter does not aim at the gradual inte-
gration of the country in the EU internal market by setting up a DCFTA but rather 
seeks to establish enhanced trade cooperation and regulatory cooperation in compli-
ance with the rights and obligations arising from WTO membership. 
 In the EU ’ s southern neighbourhood, the ENP resulted in a further broadening 
and deepening of the EU ’ s relations with certain southern neighbours. For instance, 
bilateral agreements on agricultural, processed agricultural and fi sheries products have 
been concluded in the form of an exchange of letters and then added as protocols to the 
EMAAs with Israel, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan. In addition, new dispute settlement 
protocols have been concluded with Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Morocco. 
Negotiations on the further liberalisation of trade with a view to the establishment of 
a DCFTA have been launched with Tunisia and Morocco but did not yet result in a 
further amendment of the EMAAs. 29 With Morocco, the dispute concerning the right 
to self-determination of the Western Sahara further complicates the negotiations. 30 
 P Van Elsuwege and G Van der Loo,  ‘ Continuity and Change in the Legal 
Relations between the EU and its Neighbours: A Result of Path Dependency and 
Spill-over Eff ects ’ in D Bouris and T Schumacher (eds)  The Revised European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy (London, 
Palgrave, 2017) 107 – 08 
 Also the legal framework of the EU ’ s (trade) relations with the Mediterranean 
ENP countries is under revision. The initial EMAAs provided only for a 
 liberalisation of trade in goods over a transitional period of up to 12 years. 
More sensitive agricultural, fi shery and processed agricultural products are 
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largely left outside the scope of these agreements and most EMAAs contain 
little services liberalisation. Also the EMAAs ’ provisions on TBT, SPS, IPR, 
public procurement, competition, transparency and movement of capital are 
limited or absent. However, already from the very outset (ie the 1995 Barcelona 
Declaration), the parties agreed to further broaden and deepen the EMAA FTAs 
and to gradually establish a free-trade area covering most goods and services by 
2010. Although this deadline was missed, several bilateral EMAA FTAs were 
gradually updated and broadened to match with the revamped trade objectives 
of the ENP and the Union for the Mediterranean. Remarkably, DCFTAs were 
initially only off ered to the EaP countries, and not to the Mediterranean ENP 
partners. Instead, the Commission stated that the existing EMAAs had to be 
 ‘ deepened and expanded to include other regulatory areas such as  … SPS, IPR, 
public procurement, trade facilitation and competition ’ . In this view, additional 
bilateral agreements on agricultural products were concluded and added as a 
Protocol to the respective EMAAs with Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the 
Palestinian Authority and supplementary agreements on dispute settlement 
have been concluded with Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Morocco. 
Negotiations were also launched with several partner countries to further 
 liberalise trade in services. Nevertheless, even these  ‘ broadened ’ EMAA FTAs 
are still a far cry from the three EaP DCFTAs. 
 It was only after the Arab Spring that DCFTAs were off ered to the Mediterranean 
neighbours  … The Council adopted negotiating directives for DCFTAs with 
Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia in December 2011 and the fi rst negotiations 
were launched with Morocco in March 2013. Contrary to the EaP DCFTAs, the 
envisaged DCFTAs with these four Mediterranean countries will not be included 
as a separate title in a new framework (association) agreement. Instead, these 
DCFTAs will be added as a protocol to the existing EMAAs. 
 Evidently, in the light of the ENP ’ s diff erentiation policy, the  ‘ Mediterranean ’ 
DCFTAs will diff er from the three EaP DCFTAs, depending on the economic 
situation and political will of the associated countries. In this view, the scope 
and the depth of trade liberalisation will vary. Nevertheless, the overall structure 
and objectives of the DCFTAs will most likely be similar. The Mediterranean 
DCFTAs are developed in the same ENP policy framework and have the same 
objective of  ‘ progressive economic integration with the EU Internal Market  … 
through progressive approximation of EU rules and practices ’ (European 
Commission/High Representative, 2011). The Council even explicitly stated 
that certain aspects of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA  ‘ can serve as a model for other 
ENP partners in the future ’ (Council, 2007). Although several elements of the 
EaP DCFTAs can be taken over in the Mediterranean DCFTAs, tailored to the 
needs and political will of the partner countries, it remains to be seen whether 
the Mediterranean partners, in the absence of EU membership ambitions, will 
accept the same explicit forms of market access conditionality and will commit 
themselves to similar far-reaching legislative approximation commitments. 
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Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part [1997] 
OJ L327/3. 
  33  Council of the EU, Foreign Aff airs Council, Meeting no 3457, Brussels, 14 March 2016. 
 III. EU Relations with other Neighbouring Countries 
 The geographic scope of the ENP does not encompass the countries included in the 
EU ’ s enlargement policy (see above), the Russian Federation or the so-called  ‘ Western 
European Neighbours of the EU ’ . The latter group includes the EFTA countries 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and the micro-states (Andorra, San 
Marino, Monaco). Because of political expediency, economic diff erences, and diverse 
accession perspectives, the EU engages these countries through a diff erent set of poli-
cies. With Russia, instead of the ENP, the EU aimed to set a strategic partnership 
which, however, largely failed to materialise as a result of (geo)political confl icts in 
the shared neighbourhood with the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 and Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 as the most obvious examples. With Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein, relations are conducted through the European Economic Area (EEA) 
and, with Switzerland, through a large number of bilateral agreements. Finally, the 
EU ’ s relations with the micro-states Andorra, Monaco and San Marino are  ‘ extended 
but fragmented ’ . 31 Therefore, the conclusion of one or several association agreements 
is on the agenda. In this fi nal section it is diffi  cult to do justice to the full scope of EU 
legal relations with these countries and regions and exigencies of space merely permit 
a limited overview of core legal and policy questions. 
 A. EU Relations with the Russian Federation 
 Relations between the European Union and Russia are still conducted on the basis 
of a PCA which was concluded in 1994 and entered into force in 1997 for a period of 
10 years, with automatic annual renewal. 32 In May 2006, both parties agreed that a 
new framework agreement would be negotiated to replace the PCA. 
 However, due to political obstacles such as the Russia-Georgia confl ict of August 
2008, the launch of the negotiations was postponed and later suspended as part of 
the EU ’ s sanctions adopted in the wake of Russia ’ s annexation of Crimea and the 
 destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. In addition, the EU gradually imposed other types 
of sanctions such as asset freezes and travel restrictions, targeted economic  sanctions 
and restrictions on economic cooperation. On 14 March 2016, the EU Foreign 
Ministers and High Representative Mogherini agreed on  ‘ fi ve guiding principles of 
the EU ’ s policy towards Russia ’ , which are still the foundation of contemporary 
EU – Russia relations. 33 
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 Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Mogherini at the press  conference 
following the Foreign Aff airs Council, 14 March 2016 
 Let me stress that we had, among the 28, unanimity on fi ve guiding principles 
of the European Union ’ s policy towards Russia: 
 The fi rst of these guiding principles is the full implementation of the Minsk 
agreements as a key element for any substantial change in our relations  … 
 The second principle is strengthening relations with our Eastern Partners and 
other neighbours, in particular in Central Asia, and we had very good discus-
sions on how to proceed in this respect. 
 Third, strengthening internal European Union resilience, in particular in view 
of energy security, hybrid threats and strategic communication, but not only. 
 The Fourth principle we all agreed on is the need for selective engagement 
with Russia, both on foreign policy issues  – this is clear, when it comes to 
Iran or the Middle East Peace Process or Syria, but also DPRK, migration or 
counter-terrorism, climate change  – but also in other areas where there is a clear 
European Union interest. 
 The fi fth of our guiding principles is the willingness to support more and more 
the Russian civil society and engage and invest in people-to-people contacts 
and exchanges and policies that are related to that, with a particular view to the 
youth of Russia and the youth of the European Union because we see the future 
of our countries as something we need to invest into. 
 B. EU Relations with Western European Neighbours 
 On a two-yearly basis, the Council reviews the state of EU relations with its Western 
European neighbours. The following extract of the conclusions of December 2018 
illustrates the EU ’ s interest in developing close relations in a wide variety of areas. 
With respect to economic integration, ensuring the integrity and homogeneity of the 
internal market is a key concern. 
 Council Conclusions on a Homogenous Extended Internal Market and EU 
Relations with non-EU Western European Countries, doc. 15561/18, Brussels, 
13 December 2018 
 The non-EU Western European countries are the EU ’ s closest partners in build-
ing a stronger, safer, more competitive and prosperous Europe. The Council 
emphasises the weight and importance the EU attaches to relations with all 
these special, like-minded partners. Our long-standing cooperation is based 
on shared fundamental values and interests and underpinned by our common 
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 Cambridge University Press ,  2008 )  228 . 
heritage and history, as well as strong cultural and geographical ties. Economic 
integration within the framework of the extended EU internal market brings us 
together even more and frames the inter-dependency of our future prosperity 
and competitiveness. In the last two years, our close relations have been further 
enhanced by a number of initiatives across a wide range of strategic areas. 
 The Council reiterates that the strength of our economic integration depends 
on full respect for the four freedoms of the internal market. It is, therefore, the 
responsibility of all the States which already participate or wish to increase their 
level of participation in the extended internal market to ensure its integrity and 
homogeneity, as well as full respect for equal rights and obligations for both 
citizens and businesses. 
 The Council notes the excellent cooperation in areas of EU external action 
such as development aid, human rights and the rule of law, and the common 
foreign and security policy. The Council expresses its strong appreciation for the 
alignment of its closest Western European partners to the EU ’ s foreign policy 
instruments and positions. The Council looks forward to the consolidation and 
strengthening of this alignment. Cooperation in international fora underpins 
the determination of the EU and its non-EU Western European partners to 
further strengthen multilateralism. 
 The EU ’ s relations with the Western European countries can be further divided in several 
sub-categories. The most-far reaching relationship is based on the 1994 Agreement 
creating the European Economic Area (EEA). 34 The objective of this agreement is to 
extend the EU internal market and competition rules as well as a number of so-called 
 ‘ fl anking policies ’ such as research and development, the environment, education and 
social policy to the participating EFTA States (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). 
For this purpose, the EEA involves a sophisticated institutional structure ensuring the 
homogenous interpretation and application of the shared legal rules. 35 Switzerland 
was originally meant to participate in the EEA, but in a 1992 referendum only 49.7 % 
of the Swiss people voted in favour of that country ’ s participation. 36 Instead of 
the EEA, in subsequent years the EU and Switzerland concluded a large number of 
bilateral agreements establishing cooperation between the partners in a large number 
of specifi c sectors. On several occasions, the EU criticised this approach of sectoral 
bilateralism since it creates legal uncertainty for citizens and businesses. 
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 Council Conclusions on EU Relations with the Swiss Confederation, doc. 6767/17, 
Brussels, 28 February 2017 
 The Council takes note of the reconfi rmation by Switzerland of its  attachment 
to the sectoral approach. However, the Council recalls that a precondition 
for further developing the sectoral approach remains the establishment of a 
common institutional framework for existing and future agreements through 
which Switzerland participates in the EU ’ s Single Market, in order to ensure 
homogeneity and legal certainty for citizens and businesses. The Council stresses 
the common understanding between the EU and Switzerland about the need to 
fi nalise the negotiations on the institutional framework agreement as soon as 
possible. Its conclusion will allow the EU-Swiss comprehensive partnership to 
develop to its full potential. 
 A draft institutional framework agreement was made public by the Swiss government 
in December 2018 as part of a broad internal consultation process. Hence, the fate of 
this agreement was highly uncertain when this Chapter was fi nalised. A similar remark 
can be made with respect to the post-Brexit relations between the EU and the UK. 
A political declaration adopted in the framework of the withdrawal negotiations only 
reveals that the new agreement, to be concluded after the UK is no longer a member 
of the EU, should be based on an overarching institutional framework that could take 
the form of an association agreement. 37 Finally, the EU is also reviewing its  relations 
with three small-sized states (Andorra, San Marino and Monaco) in order to conclude 
one or several association agreement(s) providing for the participation of these 
 countries in the single market and cooperation in other policy areas. 38 
 IV. The Broader Picture of EU External Relations Law 
 The legal relations between the EU and its neighbours cannot be disconnected from 
the politics of European integration and the search for eff ective and coherent EU 
external policies covering the entire scope of EU and Member State competences. 
 First and foremost, notice the diverse roles of law in EU enlargement policy, the 
ENP and the diff erentiated approaches towards the other neighbours. In all these 
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policies, a complex legal toolbox is used, tailor-made to the specifi c situation at issue. 
In all these legal relationships, an international agreement is the core framework used 
to establish relations with the EU: a Europe Agreement, a SAA, a PCA, a set of 
bilateral agreements or a multilateral legal framework such as the EEA. Surrounding 
this legal core, there is then a whole set of instruments and methodologies which are 
employed in diverse ways: soft legal accession partnerships, action plans, progress 
reports, communications, MoU ’ s, among others. A constant methodological choice in 
all these policies is then the idea of law as an EU export product, in pursuit of certain 
objectives. The EU will work with third countries for them to adopt the EU  acquis , 
for them to prepare for EU membership or to create a form of integration without 
membership. In this sense, law has a dual function: it organises EU external relations 
with its entire neighbourhood and it is also the substance itself  of EU policies. Thus, 
the EU certainly lives up to the chapeau of Article  21 TEU (mirrored in Article  8 
TEU) that its  ‘ action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world ’ . 
 Second, there is the issue of coherence between all these policies. At their core, they 
follow a similar methodology and toolbox consisting of soft and hard legal instru-
ments. However, their objectives are diff erent and this raises questions as to the effi  cacy 
and applicability of certain methodologies with certain countries or regions. For 
instance, the ENP developed from a comprehensive framework based upon a method-
ology borrowed from enlargement policy into a more diff erentiated policy with distinct 
legal and political instruments for diff erent types of neighbours as a refl ection of their 
own ambitions and capacities. 
 Third, the evolution of the legal frameworks between the EU and its neighbours 
is largely determined by the broader political context. For instance, the EU ’ s enlarge-
ment policy is essentially an instrument to ensure political stability in the fragile region 
of the Western Balkans; the diff erentiation in the EU ’ s eastern neighbourhood and the 
largely frozen relations with Russia is the result of (geo)political frictions and confl icts. 
Last, but not least, the Brexit process implies a search for a new and innovative legal 
framework with a former Member State. Whereas the divergent political situations 
require tailor-made responses, key legal principles such as the autonomy of the 
EU legal order and the integrity of the internal market defi ne the margins of the 
 political debate. 
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